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Viewing cable 05MANAMA397, BAHRAIN: MESSAGE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#05MANAMA397**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
05MANAMA397	2005-03-16 15:17	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Manama

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9115>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9116>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9117>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9118>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9119>
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<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9954>
<http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9953>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAMA 000397

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [BA](#)

SUBJECT: BAHRAIN: MESSAGE TO THE ARAB LEAGUE

REF: A. STATE 45505

[1](#)B. MANAMA 341

[1](#)C. MANAMA 319

Classified by DCM Susan L. Ziadeh for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) The Ambassador March 15 delivered Ref A demarche concerning U.S. views in advance of the Arab League summit to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs/Information Minister Mohammed Abdul Ghaffar. Abdul Ghaffar took note of the demarche but had to depart the meeting before he had a chance to respond.

12. (C) The DCM March 16 delivered demarche to MFA Assistant Under Secretary for Coordination and Follow Up Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa. Regarding Syria/Lebanon, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that Bahrain has spoken publicly and privately to encourage Syria to leave Lebanon (Refs B and C). Syria should "cut its losses." There is too much international pressure and it is in Syria's best interest to leave, he stated.

13. (C) Turning to Israeli-Palestinian affairs, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that the focus of the March 1 London conference was on building Palestinian institutions. Bahrain offered to assist by sharing its experience in developing civil society and national institutions. Bahrain proposed to train Palestinian bankers, as it had done earlier with Iraqis. Bahrain had not made any additional financial commitments in London but had offered in-kind assistance to the Palestinians.

14. (C) Addressing directly the point on diplomatic ties with Israel, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that Crown Prince Salman had met with Shimon Peres during the most recent Davos meeting and had appeared with him on a CNN program. The CP had also met with Peres at an earlier Davos meeting before the outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians in 2000. The CP told Peres that for every step Israel took with the Palestinians, Bahrain would take two steps with Israel. Bahraini officials occasionally meet with Israelis on the margins of international meetings, and Shaikh Abdul Aziz promised to look into what Bahrain could do in the future. He commented that the U.S. should ensure that Arabs who establish relations with Israel "are rewarded."

15. (C) Regarding Iraq, Shaikh Abdul Aziz said that he hopes Iraqis come to agreement soon on forming a government. Bahrain fully supports the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly and future government, and Bahrain will declare its support publicly upon formation of a government. Both Jafari and Talabani had visited Bahrain immediately after the Iraq war and the GOB had good discussions with them. He promised to speak with Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Khalifa about all these points before the Arab League summit and to request that Shaikh Mohammed encourage other Arab leaders to support the U.S. positions.

16. (C) Shaikh Abdul Aziz said he had heard that Saudi Crown Prince Abdulla, Jordan's King Abdulla, and UAE President Shaikh Khalifa were not going to the summit. He did not know why they had decided not to go, but wondered if they were concerned about security in Algiers. He confirmed that Bahrain's King Hamad was going to the summit.

MONROE